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Executive Summary 
This document describes and analyzes a system for secure and privacy-preserving                     
proximity tracing ​at large scale. This system provides a technological foundation to help                         
slow the spread of SARS-CoV-2 by simplifying and accelerating the process of notifying                         
people who might have been exposed to the virus so that they can take appropriate                             
measures to break its transmission chain. The system aims to minimise privacy and                         
security risks for individuals and communities and guarantee the highest level of data                         
protection. 
 
The goal of our proximity tracing system is to determine who has been in close physical                               
proximity to a COVID-19 positive person and thus exposed to the virus, without revealing                           
the contact’s identity or where the contact occurred. To achieve this goal, users run a                             
smartphone app that continually broadcasts an ephemeral, pseudo-random ID                 
representing the user’s phone and also records the pseudo-random IDs observed from                       
smartphones in close proximity. When a patient is diagnosed with COVID-19, she can                         
upload ​pseudo-random IDs previously broadcast from her phone to a central server. Prior                         
to the upload, all data remains exclusively on the user’s phone. Other users’ apps can use                               
data from the server to locally estimate whether the device’s owner was exposed to the                             
virus through close-range physical proximity to a COVID-19 positive person who has                       
uploaded their data. In case the app detects a high risk, it will inform the user. 
 
The system provides the following security and privacy protections: 
 
- Ensures data minimization​. The central server only observes anonymous                 
identifiers of COVID-19 positive users without any proximity information. Health                   
authorities learn no information except that provided when a user reaches out to                         
them after being notified. 
 
- Prevents abuse of data​. As the central server receives the minimum amount of                         
information tailored to its requirements, it can neither misuse the collected data                       
for other purposes, nor can it be coerced or subpoenaed to make other data                           
available. 
 
- Prevents tracking of users. ​No entity can track users that have ​not ​reported a                           
positive diagnosis. Depending on the implementation chosen, others can only                   
track COVID-19 positive users in a small geographical region limited by their                       
capability to deploy infrastructure that can receive broadcasted Bluetooth                 
beacons. 
 
- Graceful dismantling. The system will dismantle itself after the end of the                       
epidemic. COVID-19 positive users will stop uploading their data to the central                       
server, and people will stop using the app. Data on the server and in the apps is                                 
removed after 14 days. 
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We are publishing this document to inform the discussion revolving around the design                         
and implementation of proximity tracing systems. This document is accompanied by other                       
documents containing an overview of the data protection compliance of the design, an                         
extensive privacy and security risk evaluation of digital proximity tracing systems, a                       
proposal for interoperability of multiple systems deployed in different geographical                   
regions, and alternatives for developing secure upload authorisation mechanisms. 
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Changelog 
25 May 2020 
General: 
● Describe context and need for proximity tracing systems. 
● Remove secondary purpose of data sharing for research purposes (its privacy                     
implications will be discussed in a separate document). 
○ Includes clarification on why we think this is a secondary goal. 
○ Includes removing epidemiologists from the threat model. 
Designs: 
● Rename parameter that defines length of epoch from ​l ​ to ​L. 
● Smartphones now store information about received beacons rather than                 
per-​EphID ​ aggregates. 
● Clarified why the unlinkable design uploads the seed rather than the resulting                       
EphID. 
● Removed ​authorisation ​description and added pointer to “DP3T - Upload                   
Authorisation Analysis and Guidelines”. 
● Added ​one decentralized scheme for better protection against eavesdropping                 
attacks​. 
● Added a separate section on ​interoperability ​including a summary of the                     
document “Interoperability of decentralized proximity tracing systems across               
regions”. 
● Added a separate section to describe notification procedure. 
Security: 
● Improvements to security and privacy leakage analysis in accordance with                   
in-depth analysis on “Privacy and Security Attacks on Digital Proximity Tracing                     
Systems” document. 
Comparison: 
● Rewritten comparison to centralized designs to compare with concrete systems.  
 
Many of these changes were inspired by the large amount of feedback we received on                             
GitHub. The amount of issues is too long to enumerate, but we want to acknowledge the                               
effort that the community has put into improving this work. 
 
12 April 2020 
General: 
● Add enhancement for decentralised proximity tracing solutions (Section 4) to                   
prevent short-term and remote eavesdropping 
Designs: 
● Clarified different time units in which system operates for both designs 
● Clarified what are configurable system parameters for both designs 
 
10 April 2020 
General: 
● Fixed various typos 
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● Introduce the two designs early in Section 1 
 
Designs: 
● Removed two more mentions of using health care provider to do notification                       
(response issues #52 & #106; Section 2, Interoperability, and Section 4.2) 
● Fixed bug in unlinkable design to add correct value to the Cuckoo filter (response                           
issue #77; Section 3, Decentralized proximity tracing) 
● Clarify that the notification mechanism (content of the messages, how many                     
repeats, etc.) needs to be further worked out. (Section 2, Notification of risk) 
● Added local storage requirement (Section 2 and Section 3, Local storage of                       
observed events) 
● After consulting with epidemiologists, we decided that a coarse time indication in                       
days (instead of parts of days) provides sufficient granularity. (Updated                   
throughout) 
● Removed storing of auxiliary data with observed EphIDs from all designs as it is                           
currently not required (Section 2, 3 and 5) 
● Give concrete example of false positives for the Cuckoo filter (Section 3) 
 
Security and Privacy analysis: 
● Corrected suggestion that traffic analysis works against at-risk individuals.                 
(Section 4.2) 
● Clarified that in the unlinkable design it is also impossible to claim another user’s                           
EphID as one’s own. (Section 4.3) 
 
7 April 2020 
General: 
● Numbered sections for easier referencing. 
 
Goals and requirements: 
● Clarify app sends notification (Section 2) 
● Add detail about most relevant information for epidemiological analysis (Section                   
1.1) 
● Add non-goals of the system (response issue #33, Section 1.1) 
 
Previous design (renamed: ​Low-cost decentralized proximity tracing, ​in Section 2) 
● Clarification on data sent to epidemiologists (Section 2, Epidemiologists) 
● Slight tweak to design: send the day ​t ​explicitly when reporting an infected key                          
SK ​
t ​, be clear that ​t ​ is a global rather than local counter (Section 2, Setup) 
● Added second operation point in scalability (Section 2, Scalability) 
● Interoperability: added possibility of mobile network carrier, and changed hard                   
coded to config file (response issue #26, Section 2, Interoperability) 
 
Added alternative design​ (​Unlinkable decentralized proximity tracing​, in Section 3) 
● Added a new design that: prevents broadcast of seeds, provides unlinkability                     
between EphIDs, enables users to redact EphIDs that they do not want published 
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Security and Privacy analysis  
● Clarified that no notification is automatically sent to the health authority                     
(response issue #52) 
● Added introduction to threat model (response issue #47, Section 4.1) 
● Removed redacting mitigation from low-cost design (not possible due to hash                     
chain) 
● Added replay attack to create fake contacts on low-cost design (Section 4.3) 
● Added security and privacy analysis of unlinkable design (Sections 4.2 and 4.3) 
● Added comparison with both unlinkable design and low-cost design in the table                       
(Section 5.4) 
 
3 April 2020 
Initial public release   
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1. Need, purpose and requirements 
In this section, we describe the problems that motivate the need for digital proximity                           
tracing systems, the purpose of our system, and its requirements. We discuss additional,                         
potentially desirable goals that have been proposed for digital proximity tracing that our                         
design does not attempt to achieve.  
 
In the next sections, we present three protocols to implement decentralized proximity                       
tracing. One protocol is an extremely lightweight system that permits limited tracing of                         
COVID-19 positive users under very specific conditions. The other protocols provide                     
additional privacy properties at a moderate increase in cost.  
1.1 Context and need 
Beyond its medical and economic consequences, the COVID-19 pandemic poses a severe                       
challenge to healthcare authorities and governments: how to contain the spread of the                         
SARS-CoV-2 virus while simultaneously returning to normality. There has been a vigorous                       
debate about the best strategy to achieve these two goals. However, many experts                         
advocate for a strategy based on testing, contact tracing, isolation, and quarantine (TTIQ                         1
- see also the contact tracing and proximity tracing policy briefs by the Swiss National                             2 3
COVID-19 Science Task Force). 
 
A cornerstone of the TTIQ strategy is effective contact tracing. Contact tracing ​identifies                         
individuals who have been exposed ​to a COVID-19 positive person and consequently are                         
at risk of having contracted COVID-19. Identifying the contacts of a confirmed positive                         
case, so they can go into quarantine as quickly as possible​, is of crucial importance to                               
successfully containing the spread of the virus. In particular, presymptomatic                   
transmission - i.e., transmission during the 2-3 days before the onset of symptoms - is                             
estimated to account for about half of the overall transmission. Thus, asking all exposed                           4
contacts to go into quarantine very rapidly is key in breaking the transmission chains of                             
the virus. 
 
Manual contact tracing relies on interviews conducted by trained personnel. This process                       
alone is limited in responding to the demands of COVID-19 for two reasons: 
 
1) In-person or over-the-phone contact tracing interviews are time consuming, and in                     
order to handle a large number of infected people, they require many trained                         
1 ​Salathé M et al. COVID-19 epidemic in Switzerland: on the importance of testing, contact tracing                               
and isolation. ​Swiss Med Wkly.​ March 19, 2020 
2 Swiss National COVID-19 Science Task Force. “SARS-CoV-2 contact tracing strategy: epidemiologic 
and strategic considerations” (26 April 2020) Accessed on 23 May 2020: 
https://ncs-tf.ch/en/policy-briefs/contact-tracing-strategy-26-april-20-en/download 
3 National COVID-19 Science Task Force. “Digital Proximity Tracing” (15 May 2020)                       
https://ncs-tf.ch/en/policy-briefs/digital-proximity-tracing-15-may-20-en/download  
4 See e.g. He X et al. Temporal dynamics in viral shedding and transmissibility of COVID-19. Nature                                 
Medicine 2020; Ganyani T et al. Estimating the generation interval for coronavirus disease                         
(COVID-19) based on symptom onset data, March 2020. Eurosurveillance 2020. 
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contact tracers and are therefore difficult to scale rapidly.  
 
2) Even with a long, in-depth interview, the list of contacts from the interview is often                             
incomplete. In the case of a respiratory disease, such as COVID-19, any person who                           
has been in close physical proximity to a COVID-19 positive person should be listed                           
as a contact. This includes strangers that a diagnosed person will not be able to                             
recall or identify in an interview, such as nearby passengers on public                       
transportation. Even remembering all acquaintances one has encountered over                 
the past two weeks can be a challenge.  
 
These issues have prompted numerous initiatives towards the use of digital proximity                       
tracing systems to support human contact tracers. 
1.2 Purpose 
The primary purpose of digital proximity tracing systems is to provide a ​mechanism that                           
alerts users who have been in close physical proximity to a confirmed COVID-19 positive                           
case for a prolonged duration that they may have been exposed to the virus. Exposure to                               
the virus does not imply that the person has contracted COVID-19, but serves as a trigger                               
for a precautionary intervention recommended by a public health authority, such as                       
testing or quarantine. This process does not require revealing the identity of the                         
diagnosed person or when and where the contact occurred.  
 
Most adults carry smartphones throughout the day. This opens the possibility of a mobile                           
application that collects data about close physical proximity between individuals and                     
thus allows the tracing of contacts that might have been infected through droplet                         
transmission, widely assumed to be the dominant transmission route of SARS-CoV-2 . To                       5
this end, the application records exposure events between personal smartphones. An                     
exposure event is recorded when two phones are in close physical proximity for a period                             
of time, for some pre-defined value for distance and duration. ​Proximity tracing is the                           
process that the app uses to calculate whom to notify of a high-risk exposure.. 
 
Digital proximity tracing ​is a complement, not a substitute, for manual contact tracing​. It                           
can augment the efforts of health officials, gaining precious time as alerts can be sent                             
automatically and can inform otherwise unidentifiable contacts of a COVID-19 positive                     
person. 
Non-goals 
Our system does not aim to achieve the following goals: 
 
● Track positive cases​: The system does neither attempt to provide a mechanism to                         
track users who report a positive COVID-19 diagnosis through the app, nor to                         
ensure that confirmed positive cases comply with medical orders. We assume that                       
5 US CDC How COVID-19 spreads: 
https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/prevent-getting-sick/how-covid-spreads.html 
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users who have received a positive test result act responsibly and take necessary                         
precautions. Therefore, we do not attempt to detect contacts of confirmed positive                       
cases ​after ​their diagnosis nor do we attempt to detect or prevent misbehavior. In                           
our view, the gain in utility (potentially detecting irresponsible behavior of few                       
individuals) does not justify the loss of privacy for the majority of users who                           
adhere to guidelines to protect their fellow citizens. Moreover, our system does                       
not provide location-tracking functionality and cannot determine when a user is                     
“in public.” 
 
● Detect hotspots or trajectories of positive cases​: The system does not attempt to                         
identify locations frequented by confirmed positive cases, which might increase                   
others’ risk of exposure. This is a deliberate design decision. We limit the purpose                           
of our system to its primary goal. This choice enables us to collect and process                             
very little data. In particular it avoids collecting location data, which is highly                         
sensitive and very difficult to publish in a privacy-preserving way.  
 
● Sharing data for research purposes : The system is not designed to support                       6
epidemiological research. As a side effect of fulfilling their primary purpose,                     
proximity tracing systems produce data about close-range proximity between                 
personal smartphones that might be of great value to epidemiologists and related                       
research groups. This has triggered a public debate about whether proximity                     
tracing systems should be designed specifically to collect additional data that                     
might help epidemiologists improve their understanding of and predictions about                   
the spread of SARS-CoV-2. 
 
We strongly believe, however, that it is not the time to conflate novel, untested                           
technologies with the understandable desire to collect new epidemiological                 
insights. Furthermore, the data collected by proximity tracing applications does                   
not ​allow inferences about causal transmission chains (who infected whom),                   
fomite transmission (transmission through surfaces of objects), or aerosol                 
transmission (transmission via aerosols that remain suspended in the air for some                       
time). We thus designed a system that is optimised to fulfill its primary purpose                           
and to support and complement manual contact tracing through measurement of                     
proximity over a prolonged period of time. How much of this data should be                           
shared to support epidemiological research purposes is a separate question. We                     
plan to publish a separate analysis of the privacy implications of data sharing. 
6 It is in theory possible for proximity tracing systems to additionally share data intended for                               
research purposes. However, this would invalidate the existing security and privacy analyses, and                         
would require additional in-depth investigations into the impact of the shared data and the                           
interaction with the other functions of the system. 
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1.3 System requirements 
1) Enable proximity tracing  
To fulfill its primary purpose, the application must provide the following properties: 
 
● Completeness:​ The exposure history captures all exposure events. 
 
● Precision:​ Reported exposure events must reflect actual physical proximity. 
 
● Authenticity: Exposure events are authentic, i.e., users cannot fake exposure                   
events. 
 
● Confidentiality:​ A malicious actor cannot access the contact history of a user. 
 
● Notification:​ Individuals can be informed about prolonged exposure to the virus. 
 
2) Respect and preserve digital right to privacy of individuals 
It is of paramount importance that any digital solution to proximity tracing ​​respects the                           
privacy of individual users and communities ​and ​​complies with relevant data protection                       
guidelines such as the European General Data Protection Regulation (​EDPB Statement on                       
GDPR and COVID-19​) or the related Swiss law​. The GDPR does not prevent the use of                               
personal data for public health, particularly in times of crisis, but it still imposes a                             
binding obligation to ensure that 'only personal data which are necessary for each                         
specific purpose of the processing are processed' (art 25). It is therefore a legal                           
requirement to consider, particularly in the creation of systems with major implications                       
for rights and freedoms, whether such a system could be technically designed to use and                             
retain less data while achieving the same effect. To this end, an application must                           
minimize the amount of data collected and processed to avoid risks for individuals and                           
communities, and it should reveal only the minimum information truly needed to each                         
authorized entity. 
 
Furthermore, a common concern with systems such as these is that the data and                           
infrastructure might be used beyond its originally intended purpose. Data protection law                       
supports the overarching principle of ‘​purpose limitation​’ — precluding the widening of                       
purposes after the crisis through technical limitations. Such assurances will likely be                       
important to achieve the necessary level of adoption in each country and across Europe,                           
by providing citizens with the confidence and trust that their personal data is protected                           
and used appropriately and carefully. Only applications that do not violate a user’s                         
privacy ​​by design​ are likely to be widely accepted. 
 
The system should provide the following guarantees: 
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● Data use: ​Data collection and use should be limited to the purpose of the data                             
collection: proximity tracing. This implies that the design should avoid collecting                     
and using any data, for example geolocation data, that is not directly related to                           
the task of detecting a close contact between two people. 
 
● Controlled inference: ​Inferences about individuals and communities, such as                 
information about social interactions or medical diagnosis, should be controlled                   
to avoid unintended information leakage. Each authorised entity should only be                     
able to learn the information strictly necessary to fulfill its own requirements. 
 
● Protect identities: ​The system should collect, store, and use anonymous or                     
pseudonymous data that is not directly linkable to an individual’s identity where                       
possible. 
 
● Erasure: ​The system should respect best practices in terms of data retention                       
periods and delete any data that is not relevant. 
 
3) Fulfill the scalability requirements posed by a global pandemic 
SARS-CoV-2 is rapidly spreading across the globe following people across national                     
borders and continents. As a core principle of free democratic societies, after the current                           
confinement measures end, free movement should resume. Proximity tracing must                   
support free movement across borders and scale to the world’s population. 
 
The system should provide the following guarantees: 
 
● Scalability:​ The system scales to billions of users. 
 
● Interoperability:​ The system works across borders and health authorities. 
 
4) Feasibility under current technical constraints 
There is an urgency to not only design but ​implement a digital system that simplifies and                               
accelerates proximity tracing in the near future. This mandates a system design that is                           
mindful of the technical constraints​ posed by currently available technologies. 
 
● No reliance on new breakthroughs: ​The system should, as far as possible, only use                           
techniques, infrastructure, and methods readily available at the time of                   
development and avoid relying on new breakthroughs in areas such as                     
cryptography, GPS localisation, Bluetooth or Ultra Wide Band distance                 
measurements; or new deployments such as novel anonymous communications                 
systems that have not been widely tested for privacy. 
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● Widely available hardware​: The goal of high adoption of proximity tracing can only                         
be achieved if both server- and client-side applications can run on widely                       
available smartphones and server hardware. 
2. Decentralized proximity tracing 
We propose a privacy-friendly, decentralized proximity tracing system that reveals                   
minimal information to the backend server. We propose three different protocols to                       
support exposure detection and tracing. These protocols provide developers with choice                     
regarding the trade-off between privacy and computation cost but share a common                       
framework. 
 
In all three protocols, smartphones locally generate frequently-changing ​ephemeral                 
identifiers (​EphIDs ​) and broadcast them via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) beacons. Other                       
smartphones observe these beacons and store them together with a time indication and                         
measurements to estimate exposure (e.g., signal attenuations). See Figure AA. 
 
The proximity tracing process is supported by a ​backend server that distributes                       
anonymous exposure information to the app running on each phone. This backend server                         7
is trusted to not add information (i.e., to not add fake exposure events) nor remove                             
information (i.e., to not remove exposure events) and to be available. The backend acts                           
solely as a communication platform and does not perform any processing. It is ​untrusted                           
with regards to protecting users’ privacy​. In other words, the privacy of the users in the                               
system does not depend on the actions of this server. Even if the server is compromised                               
or seized, their privacy remains intact.  
 
If patients are diagnosed with COVID-19, they will be authorized by health authorities to                           
publish a protocol-specific representation of their ​EphIDs for the contagious period to                       
aid in decentralized proximity tracing. We are aware that each country, and in some cases                             
each country’s regions, will have existing processes and systems in place to manage mass                           
testing, to communicate between testing facilities and laboratories, and to inform                     
patients. In a separate document, we discuss three proposals for secure mechanisms to                         8
validate upload requests from personal devices to the central backend and evaluate their                         
usability trade-offs. Here, we leave the authorisation mechanism abstract. We further                     
note that some implementations of the system might skip the authorisation step                       
altogether and rely on self-reporting. However, we strongly advise implementing one of                       
the proposed authorisation mechanisms to achieve stronger security guarantees. 
 
When authorized, users can instruct their phones to upload a representation of the                         
EphIDs to the backend. The backend stores the uploaded ​representations. ​To protect                       
7 We assume that the MAC address of the phone changes every time the ephemeral identifier                               
(EphID) changes to prevent prolonged tracking of smartphones. 
8 “Secure Upload Authorisation for Digital Proximity Tracing”, The DP-3T Project,                     
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Upload%20Authorisation%20An
alysis%20and%20Guidelines.pdf  
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COVID-positive users from network observers, all phones equipped with the app generate                       
dummy traffic to provide plausible deniability of real uploads. 
 
Other smartphones periodically query the backend for information and reconstruct the                     
corresponding ​EphIDs of COVID-19 positive users locally. If the smartphone has recorded                       
beacons corresponding to any of the reported ​EphID ​s, then the smartphone’s user might                         
have been exposed to the virus. The smartphone uses the exposure measurements of the                           
matched beacons​ ​to estimate the exposure of the phone’s owner, see Section 4. 
 
 
Figure AA: Processing and storing of observed beacons. 
2.1 Low-cost decentralized proximity tracing 
In this section, we present a low-cost protocol that has good privacy properties and very                             
small bandwidth requirements. 
Setup 
Initial seed generation. ​Let ​t be the current day. Smartphones generate a random initial                           
daily seed ​SK ​
t ​for the current day ​t ​. We assume days correspond to UTC days.  
Creating ephemeral IDs (​EphIDs ​) 
EphID​ Generation​. Each day, smartphones rotate their secret day seed ​SK ​
t ​ by computing 
SK ​
t ​ = H( SK ​t - 1 ​ ) ​, 
where ​H is a cryptographic hash function. The smartphone will use the seed ​SK ​
t
during                             
day ​t ​ to generate ​EphIDs ​. 
To avoid location tracking via broadcast identifiers, devices should frequently change the                       
ephemeral identifier ​EphID that they broadcast to other devices. We refer to the duration                           
for which a device broadcasts the same ​EphID ​as an ​epoch​. The length of an epoch, in                                
minutes, is a configurable system parameter that we denote as ​L ​.  
 
At the beginning of each day ​t ​, smartphones locally generate a list of ​n = (24 * 60)/L                               
new ​EphID ​
i ​s to broadcast during day ​t ​. Given the day seed ​SK ​t ​, each device computes 
EphID ​
1 ​ || ... || EphID ​n ​ = PRG( PRF(SK ​t ​, “broadcast key”) ), 
where ​PRF is a pseudo-random function (e.g., HMAC-SHA256), ​“broadcast key” is a                      
fixed, public string, and PRG is a pseudorandom generator (e.g. AES in counter mode)                           
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producing ​n * 16 bytes, which we split into 16-byte chunks to obtain the ​n ephemeral                             
Bluetooth identifiers ​EphID ​ for the day. 
Smartphones pick a random order in which to broadcast the ​EphIDs during the day. Each                             
EphID ​
i ​is broadcast for ​L ​ minutes. 
Local storage of observed ​EphID​s and seeds ​SK​
t
  
For each received beacon, phones store: 
 
● The received ephemeral Bluetooth identifier ​EphID. 
 
● The exposure measurement (e.g., signal attenuation). 
 
● The day on which this beacon was received (e.g., “April 2”). 
 
Note that an ​EphID could be received multiple times and will result in multiple entries in                               
the database (Figure AA). For efficient storage, we propose to group these entries by                           
EphID ​, resulting in 36 bytes per ​EphID ​. Given a very conservative estimate of 140k                           
different observations over the course of 14 days (i.e., if epochs are 15 minutes, these are                               
100 different people observed per epoch), this would require around 6.1 MB. 
 
In addition, each device stores the seeds ​SK ​
t
it generated during the past 14 days. This                               
parameter (i.e., 14 days), which defines the maximum period for which any data (both                           
observed and generated ​EphIDs) ​is stored on the device, is a system parameter and is                           
determined by guidance from health authorities.  
Decentralized proximity tracing 
Once the health authority has authorised the proximity tracing for a confirmed COVID-19                         
positive user (Figure PT, step 1), the user can instruct their phone to send to the backend                                 
the seed ​SK ​
t
and the day ​t corresponding to the first day in which the user was                                 
considered to be contagious (Figure PT, step 2). The start date of the contagious window ​t                               
can either be determined by the health authority or the user might be trusted to manually                               
enter this day. Epidemiologists estimate that for COVID-19 the contagious window starts 1                         9
to 3 days before the onset of symptoms. 
 
After reporting the seed ​SK ​
t ​and day ​t for the first day of the contagious window, the                                
smartphone deletes ​SK ​
t ​. It then picks a completely new random seed and commences                         
broadcasting ​EphIDs derived from this new seed. This ensures that after uploading their                         
past seed, users do not become trackable. Recall that our system does not attempt to                             
track users after reporting a diagnosis because we assume users act responsibly. The new                           
seed will thus only be uploaded if necessary, i.e., if after a second positive diagnosis the                               
user is considered contagious. 
9 “Secure Upload Authorisation for Digital Proximity Tracing”, The DP-3T Project,                     
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Upload%20Authorisation%20An
alysis%20and%20Guidelines.pdf  
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Given the seed ​SK ​
t ​, everyone can compute all ephemeral identifiers ​EphID broadcast by                         
the COVID-19 positive user, starting from day ​t by repeating the process described in                           
EphID generation​ above. 
 
The backend collects the pairs (​SK ​
t ​,t ​) of COVID-19 positive users. Phones periodically                       
download these pairs (Figure PT, step 3). Each smartphone uses this pair to reconstruct                           
the list of ​EphIDs of a diagnosed person for each day ​t’ and checks (1) if it has observed                                     
any beacon with one of these ​EphIDs on day ​t’ and (2) that such observations occurred                               
before the corresponding seed ​SK ​
t
was published. Restricting the matching to a specific                         10
day limits replay attacks in which malicious users redistribute captured ​EphID ​s and                       
ensures more efficient lookups. 
 
For each matching recorded beacon (e.g., a beacon with an EphID that was transmitted by                             
a user who reported a positive diagnosis), the beacon’s receive time and exposure                         
measurement are taken into account for the exposure risk computation (Figure PT, step 4)                           
and ​Section 4​. 
 
 
Figure PT: proximity tracing process. 
Scalability 
For each user who reports a positive diagnosis, the backend needs to store a 32-byte seed                               
and a 2-byte day counter for the duration of the contagious window. Storage cost at the                               
backend is therefore not a problem. Throughout the day, smartphones download the                       
10 To facilitate this check, the smartphone temporarily stores a more precise receive timestamp of                             
all the beacons it received after the last download from the server. Once all downloads from the                                 
server have been processed, the phone coarsens this timestamp for all past observations. 
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32-byte seeds and 2-byte day counters of newly diagnosed patients. This data is static                           
and can therefore be effectively served through a content delivery network (CDN). 
2.2. Unlinkable decentralized proximity tracing 
In this section, we present a variant of the low-cost design in the previous section that                               
offers better privacy properties than the low-cost design at the cost of increased                         
bandwidth. This design does not disseminate a list containing the seeds of users who                           
have reported a positive diagnosis. Instead, the ephemeral identifiers of COVID-19                     
positive users are hashed and stored in a Cuckoo filter, which is then distributed to other                               
users. 
 
This design choice offers several advantages. It prevents adversaries from linking the                       
ephemeral identifiers of COVID-19 positive users (see privacy analysis for details), and it                         
enables COVID-19 positive users to redact, after a positive diagnosis, identifiers                     
corresponding to sensitive locations, times, or periods in which users are certain they                         
have not been in contact with other people, e.g. while they were alone or behind a                               
window. 
Setup 
No setup is needed. 
Generating ephemeral IDs 
As in the low-cost design, smartphones broadcast each ephemeral identifier ​EphID                     
during one epoch of fixed duration ​L. Epochs ​i are encoded relative to a fixed starting                               
point shared by all entities in the system. 
 
Smartphones generate the ephemeral identifier ​EphID ​
i
for each epoch ​i as follows. The                         
smartphone draws a random 32-byte per-epoch seed ​seed ​
i ​ and sets: 
EphID ​
i ​ = LEFTMOST128( H( seed ​i ​ ) ), 
where ​H is a cryptographic hash function, and ​LEFTMOST128 takes the leftmost 128 bits                           
of the hash output. Smartphones store the seeds corresponding to all past epochs in the                             
last 14 days. They delete older seeds. As before, the maximum storage period is a system                               
parameter and is determined with guidance from health authorities.  
Local storage of observed EphIDs 
For each observed beacon the smartphone stores: 
 
● The hashed string ​H(EphID || i) ​, where ​H is a cryptographic hash function, and                         
EphID the identifier of the beacon, and ​i is the epoch in which the beacon is                               
received. (Note that this differs from the low-cost design, in which the phone                         
stores the raw ​EphID ​.) 
 
● The exposure measurement (e.g., signal attenuation) 
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● The day in which this beacon was received (e.g., “April 2”). 
 
We include the epoch ​i in the hash to ensure that replaying an ​EphID outside the epoch                                 
in which it was originally broadcast can never cause a fake at-risk event (regardless of                             
whether the ​EphID ​ corresponds to a person who later reports a positive diagnosis). 
 
For efficiency of storage, we propose to group these entries by hashed string. A single                             
entry then requires around 52 bytes. Given a very conservative estimate of 140k different                           
observations over the course of 14 days (i.e., 100 people observed per epoch), this would                             
require around 6.9 MB of local storage. 
Decentralized proximity tracing 
In case of a positive diagnosis, users can instruct their device to upload a representation                             
of the ​EphIDs produced by the smartphone during the contagious window. Unlike in the                           
low-cost design, the user first has the option to ​redact ​identifiers by choosing the set ​I                               
of epochs for which they want to reveal their identifiers. For example, the user may want                               
to exclude Monday morning and Friday night. The phone then uploads the set ​{(i,                           
seed ​
i ​)} for all epochs ​i in ​I ​. Requiring ​seed ​i ​rather than the resulting ​EphID ​, ensures                            
that malicious users cannot claim somebody else’s ​EphID as their own (see ​security                         
analysis​).  
 
Periodically (e.g., every 2 hours), the backend creates a new Cuckoo filter ​F and for each                               
pair ​(i, seed ​
i ​) ​ uploaded by a COVID-19 positive user it inserts 
H ( LEFTMOST128( H( seed ​
i ​ ) ) || i) 
into the Cuckoo filter ​F ​, i.e., the hashed string ​H(EphID || i) where ​EphID =                          
LEFTMOST128( H( seed ​
i
) ) as above. The outer hash-function is needed for                     
security. The backend publishes the filter. All smartphones download it.  
Each smartphone uses the filter ​F to check if in the past (i.e., before the corresponding                               
filter ​F was published), it has observed any of the ​EphIDs reported by COVID-19 positive                             
users. The phone checks if any of its stored hashes are included in the filter ​F. 
 
For each matching beacon (e.g., a beacon with a recorded hashed identifier that was                           
transmitted by a user who reported a positive diagnosis), the beacon’s receive time and                           
exposure measurement are provided to the exposure risk computation (​Section 4​). 
Cuckoo filters have a low, but non-zero, probability of false positives, that is reporting                           
that they contain an element that was not in the input set. In order to avoid unnecessarily                                 
alarming users, we select the parameters of the Cuckoo filter such that false positives are                             
highly unlikely to occur even with heavy usage of the system over a number of years. In                                 
the scalability calculation below, we configure the filter to produce one false positive in a                             
million users over a period of 5 years. 
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The use of a Cuckoo filter hides the set of ephemeral identifiers of COVID-19 positive                             
users from the general public. The system uses a Cuckoo filter in conjunction with inputs                             
that are obtained from cryptographic hashes of random values (the seeds, concatenated                       
with timestamps). The inputs to the filter are sparse in a large set, i.e., the set of all                                   
possible inputs (128-bit strings). These two factors makes enumeration attacks against the                       
filter an unattractive attack vector for adversaries, while still making it possible for users                           
who have observed particular ephemeral identifiers to check for their inclusion in the                         
filter. Attacks that attempt to reverse the filter and directly recover inputs from values                           
held in the filter do not result in exposure of ephemeral IDs because of the extra layer of                                   
hashing performed on ephemeral IDs before entering them into the filter. 
Scalability 
This design requires more bandwidth and storage than in the low-cost design. The                         
backend needs to store Cuckoo filters containing the hashed identifiers of COVID-19                       
positive users during the contagious period. Smartphones regularly download new cuckoo                     
filters containing the latest hashed identifiers of COVID-positive patients. This data is                       
static and can therefore be effectively served through a content delivery network. The                         
computational cost on the phone is likely smaller than in the low-cost design, as phones                             
only need to do one lookup per stored hashed identifier per cuckoo filter sent by the                               
backend. 
2.3. Hybrid decentralized proximity tracing 
In this section, we present a hybrid design that combines ideas from the low-cost design                             
and the unlinkable design. In this design, phones generate random seeds for each time                           
window (for example, of length 2 hours) and use these seeds similar to the low-cost                             
design to generate ephemeral identifiers for all epochs within that time window. Users                         
upload seeds only if they are relevant to exposure estimation by other users. 
 
Depending on the length of the time window, this design offers much better protection                           
against linking ephemeral identifiers of COVID-19 positive users than the low-cost design                       
and enables a user to redact time windows. The protection against tracking is weaker                           
than the unlinkable design, but this scheme has a smaller bandwidth requirement. 
 
This design is very similar to the Google/Apple design. The Google/Apple design uses                         11
one seed to generate the ephemeral identifiers of that day, and thus corresponds to the                             
special case where windows are 1 day long. In that configuration, the advantages with                           
respect to the low-cost design are smaller. We recommend a time window of 2 or 4 hours                                 
depending on the bandwidth availability in the region. 
Setup 
No setup is needed. 
11 See ​https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/ 
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Generating ephemeral IDs 
As in the previous designs, smartphones broadcast ​EphID during an epoch of fixed                         
duration ​L. We group consecutive epochs into a time window ​w ​. The length of a time                               
window can range from 10 minutes to a full day and needs to be an integer multiple of ​L ​.  
 
At the start of each time window ​w ​, smartphones pick a new random 16-byte seed ​seed ​
w ​.                               
Given the seed ​seed ​
w ​for window ​w ​, each device computes 
 
EphID ​
w,1 ​ || ... || EphID ​w,n ​ = PRG( PRF(seed ​w ​, “DP3T-HYBRID”) ), 
where ​PRF is a pseudo-random function (e.g., HMAC-SHA256), ​“DP3T-HYBRID” is a fixed                       
and public string, and PRG is a pseudorandom generator (e.g. AES in counter mode)                           
producing ​n * 16 bytes, which we split into 16-byte chunks to obtain the ​n ephemeral                             
Bluetooth identifiers ​EphID ​ for the window ​w ​. 
Smartphones pick a random order in which to broadcast the ​n ephemeral Bluetooth                         
identifiers within the window ​w ​. Each ​EphID ​
i ​is broadcast for ​L ​ minutes. 
Local storage of observed EphIDs 
Smartphones locally record the observed beacons, similar to the low-cost design. For                       
each received beacon the phone stores: 
 
● The received ephemeral Bluetooth identifier ​EphID ​, 
 
● The exposure measurement, 
 
● The time window ​w ​ in which the ​EphID ​ was received. 
 
For efficiency of storage, we propose to group these entries by EphID, resulting in 36 bytes                               
per ​EphID ​. Given a very conservative estimate of observing 140k different ​EphID ​s over                         
the course of 14 days (i.e., if epochs are 15 minutes, this would be 100 people observed                                 
per epoch), this would require 4.8 MB of local storage. 
Decentralized proximity tracing 
In case of a positive diagnosis, users can instruct their device to upload the relevant                             
seeds ​seed ​
w
generated by the smartphone during the contagious period. If the phone did                           
not observe any ​EphID ​sufficiently close to be considered as an exposure during a time                            
window ​w ​, it does not upload the corresponding seed ​seed ​
w
for efficiency. As in the                             
unlinkable design, the user additionally has the option to ​redact identifiers, by choosing                         
the set ​W of windows for which they want to reveal their identifiers. For example, the user                                 
may want to exclude windows for Monday morning and Friday night. The phone then                           
uploads the set ​{(w, seed ​
w ​)} ​ for all windows ​w ​ in ​W. 
 
The backend collects pairs ​(w, seed ​
w ​) of COVID-19 positive users. Phones periodically                      
download these pairs. Each smartphone uses these pairs to reconstruct the list of                         
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EphIDs of COVID-19 positive users for each window ​w’ and checks if it has observed any                               
of these ​EphIDs during window ​w’ ​in the past (i.e., before the corresponding seed ​seed ​
w
                             
was published). Restricting the matching to a specific time window limits replay attacks in                           
which malicious users redistribute captured ​EphID ​s and ensures more efficient lookups. 
 
For each matching recorded beacon (e.g., a beacon with an ​EphID that was transmitted                           
by a COVID-19 positive user), the beacon’s receive time and exposure measurement are                         
given as inputs to the exposure risk computation, see ​Section 4​. 
Scalability 
This design requires more bandwidth and storage than the low-cost design, but less than                           
the unlinkable design. The backend needs to store the ​(w, seed ​
w ​) pairs corresponding                        
to COVID-19 positive users. Smartphones regularly download all new pairs. This data is                         
static and can therefore be effectively served through a content delivery network. 
 
The download cost depends on the length of the window and how many windows can be                               
automatically omitted by the smartphone when uploading seeds. See Figure SH for a                         
comparison. See the next section for how we computed these numbers. 
 
Figure SH: Scalability of the hybrid design​. Comparison of the daily download cost per 
user (MB) depending on the number of new confirmed cases per day for different upload 
configurations of the hybrid design. We compare the download cost for different lengths 
of the time window ​w ​ under two different assumptions. In the “normal” case, 
COVID-positive users upload seeds for all windows. In the “reduced” case their 
smartphone automatically omits the seeds for windows with a  total length of 8 hours 
(e.g., because they were alone during that time and the phone did not detect any 
contacts). 
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2.4 Scalability 
All three designs benefit from the use of a content delivery network (CDN). Smartphones                           
of COVID-positive patients upload a small amount of data to the backend server. The                           
backend server regularly redistributes this data to all other smartphones using a CDN. The                           
daily download size scales linearly with the number of COVID-positive patients in all three                           
designs. We assume a contagious window of 5 days and 15-minute epochs. 
 
● In the low-cost design, the server needs to distribute one (​SK ​
t ​, ​t ​) pair per                           
diagnosed patient. This requires 36 bytes per patient. 
 
● In the unlinkable design, the server needs to distribute 5 * 96 hashed strings per                             
diagnosed patient. When using a well-tuned Cuckoo filter, this requires 2880 bytes                       
per patient. 
 
● In the hybrid design, we assume windows of 2 to 4 hours. The server must                             
therefore distribute 5 * 6 or 5 * 12 seeds per diagnosed patient. This requires 480                               
to 960 bytes per user. Users that can redact 8 hours of windows only need to send                                 
5 * 4 and 5 * 8 seeds, requiring 320 and 640 bytes respectively. 
 
See Figure DC for the resulting daily download cost for smartphones. Table DC shows                           
specific values based on peak rates in several countries. 
 
We expect that proximity tracing systems, even when deployed in large EU countries, will                           
operate in the range of up to 2000 new cases a day. At the time of writing, all large EU                                       
countries see less than 1500 new cases a day. We expect that if the rate of new cases                                   
increases, countries will take policy measures to restrict the infection rates. Thus, we                         
expect the download cost to never exceed the single-digit requirement.  
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Figure DC: Comparison of the daily download cost per user (MB) by number of new 
confirmed cases per day for different decentralised proximity tracing designs.  
 
 
Table DC: Comparison of the daily per user download (MB) for different designs and                           
countries. For each country, we give the daily per user download at the overall peak of                               
contagion and the maximum number of daily new cases between May 13 and May 20, 2020. 
 Low-cost (MB) Unlinkable (MB) Hybrid (4h) (MB) 
Switzerland (8M)    
1390 cases 0.04 3.82 0.64 
58 cases 0.00 0.16 0.03 
Germany (83M)    
6294 cases 0.19 17.29 2.88 
933 cases 0.03 2.56 0.43 
France (67M)    
7578 cases 0.23 20.81 3.47 
708 cases 0.02 1.94 0.32 
Spain (42M)    
9181 cases 0.28 25.22 4.20 
849 cases 0.03 2.33 0.39 
Italy (60M)    
6557 cases 0.20 18.01 3.00 
1402 cases 0.04 3.85 0.64 
3. Interoperability in decentralised proximity tracing systems 
Effective proximity tracing systems must be interoperable across borders. Phones of users                       
visiting foreign countries, whether it is for work, or for leisure, must be able to capture                               
beacons from users in countries that they visit and include beacons of COVID-19                         
diagnosed patients in those countries in their exposure computation. Likewise, residents                     
of a country must be able to receive notifications if a visitor to their country is diagnosed                                 
with COVID-19. 
 
All three proposed designs support interoperability between different operators of                   
different regions. Interoperability is possible as long as these operators use one of the                           
decentralized designs proposed in this document. To interoperate with a specific                     
protocol, the smartphone application must be able to process tracing data published for                         
that protocol. That is, the application must run as many protocols as it needs to                             
interoperate with. 
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To enable cross-border interoperability, backend servers of different regions (e.g.,                   
countries, or states) must exchange data. We propose the following mechanisms,                     
explained in detail in other documents.  12
 
First, when visiting a region, users enter the region into their phone. If a user visits a                                 
region frequently, e.g., workers commuting across borders, both regions can be                     
permanently added to their phones. Phones use the list of visited regions to retrieve any                             
proximity tracing data published by that region’s backend for up to 14 days after the end                               
of the users’ visit. The way in which proximity data are published differs by protocol. For                               
the low-cost design, this is a list of (​SK ​
t ​,t ​) pairs, for the unlinkable design this is the                                 
cuckoo filter, and for the hybrid design this is the list of ​(w, seed ​
w ​) ​pairs. The phones                              
then follow the protocol-specific procedures to match observed ​EphIDs ​, which they then                       
feed into the exposure risk computation described in the next section. 
 
Second, to ensure all contacts of diagnosed users are notified, when a user is diagnosed                             
with COVID-19, the phone will ask the user for recently visited regions. When uploading                           
the seeds to the server, the phones also supply the list of visited regions. The backend                               
authenticates the upload and then redistributes the uploaded tracing data to all visited                         
regions. As a result, users in those regions will download this data and can determine if                               
they observed any of the visitors’ ​EphIDs ​.  
4. Exposure estimation 
The goal of the exposure estimation is to estimate the duration of the smartphone                           
owner’s exposure to COVID-19 positive users in the past. This measurement serves as a                           
proxy for the level of exposure to the SARS-CoV-2 virus. Local health authorities                         
determine the exposure threshold for when a user should receive a notification. A                         
prolonged exposure to the virus does not imply that the virus has been transmitted.                           
However, the notification serves as a trigger for precautionary interventions                   
recommended by local health authorities, such as testing or quarantine. 
 
To compute exposure, the smartphone proceeds as follows. First, if necessary, it                       
downloads the latest parameters provided by the health authority. Next, it takes all                         
matches reported by the proximity tracing system for the past 14 days and estimates the                             
exposure. In Switzerland, for instance, for each day, the phone combines the exposure                         
measurements (e.g. signal attenuations) of all matches corresponding to that day, to                       
compute a per-day exposure score.  13
 
12 For an overview see “Interoperability of decentralized proximity tracing systems across regions”                         
retrieved from ​https://drive.google.com/file/d/1mGfE7rMKNmc51TG4ceE9PHEggN8rHOXk on 20         
May 2020. A more detailed specification is provided here: “Decentralized Proximity Tracing:                       
Interoperability Specification”. The DP-3T Team (18 May 2020). Retrieved on 20 May 2020 from:                           
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/DP3T%20-%20Interoperability%20Decentraliz
ed%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Specification%20(Preview).pdf 
13 Details on the exposure estimation from BLE proximity measurements will be provided soon as                             
separate documentation 
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If the exposure score is above the threshold determined by the health authority, the                           
smartphone displays a notification that the user has been exposed to the virus through                           
prolonged physical proximity to COVID-19 positive individuals. The notification advises                   
the user on what to do and where to find more information. The details of the messages                                 
displayed, including the rate of repeated notifications and their content, need to be                         
designed in close collaboration with health authorities and mental health experts. 
5. Security and privacy considerations 
 
In this section, we analyse the privacy and security properties of the three decentralised                           
proximity tracing protocols introduced in this document. We have published a separate,                       
far more extensive, risk evaluation of digital proximity tracing systems that includes the                         14
class of decentralised systems our three designs belong to.  
5.1 Threat model 
In this section, we describe the adversaries that we take into account when carrying out                             
the security and privacy analysis. For each of these adversaries, we describe their                         
capabilities and the kind of risk they pose for the system. In the next section, we analyze                                 
the security and privacy of the system with respect to these adversaries. 
 
Regular user. A typical user of the system that is assumed to be able to install and use the                                     
application by navigating its user interface (UI). They exclusively look at information                       
available via the app’s UI to infer private information about other users. 
 
Tech-savvy user ​(Blackhat/Whitehat hacker, NGOs, Academic researchers, etc.)​. ​This user                   
has access to the system via the mobile App. In addition, she can set up (BT, WiFi, and                                   
Mobile) antennas to eavesdrop locally. Finally, she can decompile/modify the app, and                       
she has access to the backend source code. 
 
● (Whitehat hacker) Will investigate the App code, the information in the phone, and                         
will look at what information is exchanged with the server (using an antenna or                           
software installed on the phone, e.g., ​Lumen​) or broadcast via Bluetooth (passive).  
 
● (Malicious) Can DOS the system (targeted or system-wide), deviate from protocols,                     
and actively broadcast Bluetooth identifiers. 
 
Eavesdropper ​(Internet Service Provider, Local System administrators, Bluetooth sniffer)​.                 
They can observe network communication (i.e., source and destination of packages,                     
payload, time) and/or BLE broadcast messages. 
 
14 “Privacy and Security Risk Evaluation of Digital Proximity Tracing Systems”, The DP-3T Project,                           
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Secu
rity%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf  
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● (Network adversary) Can use observed network traffic to attempt to determine the                       
state of a user (e.g., whether they are at-risk, COVID-19 positive, etc.). 
 
● (Local Bluetooth BLE Sniffer) Can observe local Bluetooth broadcasts (possibly                   
with a powerful antenna to cover a wider area) and try to trace people. 
 
It should be noted however that in many instances, for individuals or companies to use                             
data in this way, or to collect data about passers-by to try and estimate their infection                               
status based on the announced identifiers, will fall foul of a range of existing national and                               
European laws around data protection, ePrivacy and computer misuse. 
 
Health authority. ​Receives information about COVID-19 positive users as part of their                       
normal operations to diagnose patients. The health authority learns information about                     
at-risk people only when these at-risk people themselves reach out to the health                         
authority (e.g., after receiving a notification from their app). 
 
Backend and App developers. ​Can access all data stored at the servers. Moreover, the                           
backend can query data from the mobile app in the same way that it would do during                                 
normal operations (in our designs, it can only change the data downloaded by the                           
smartphones). They could also change the code of their backend software and the code of                             
the mobile apps (including parameters related to proximity tracing). We assume they will                         
not modify the mobile app because such action would be detectable. They can combine                           
and correlate information, request information from apps, combine with other public                     
information to learn (co-)location information of individuals. 
 
State-level adversary ​(Law enforcement, intelligence agencies, etc)​. Has the combined                   
capabilities of the tech-savvy user and the eavesdropper. In addition, a state-level                       
adversary can obtain subpoenas that give them the capabilities of the health authority, or                           
the backend. Their goal is to obtain information about the population or to target                           
particular individuals. They may be interested in past information, already stored in the                         
system, or future information that will enable them to trace target individuals based on                           
observed ​EphIDs ​. 
 
Unlimited-budget adversary. ​An adversary with an unlimited budget, e.g., large                   
organizations and (foreign) nation states, has the capabilities of tech-savvy users but can                         
deploy these at a much larger scale. Additionally, such an adversary might be able to gain                               
control over the project’s infrastructure such as the backend. The goals of this adversary                           
might be to learn information about the population or individuals (cf. a state-level                         
adversary) or to disrupt the proximity tracing system, resulting in a form of denial of                             
service. One form of disruption is to try cause a sizable part of the population to receive                                 
fake at-risk notifications by deploying antennas in public locations (e.g., airports, train                       
stations, shopping malls, or parliament buildings) and relaying messages far and wide.                       
This relay attack increases the chances of “at risk” contacts for the targeted population                           
because their phones will perceive proximity where there is none. 
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5.2 Privacy  
Privacy concerns 
Social graph. ​The social graph describes social relationships between users. Each node in                         
the graph represents an individual user and an edge connecting two nodes indicates that                           
there is a social relationship between the two users. A proximity tracing system does not                             
need to provide information on the social graph to any party to fulfill its primary purpose.  
  
Interaction graph. The interaction graph reflects close-range physical interactions                 
between users. A labelled edge indicates an interaction between two adjacent users at a                           
specific time. Knowledge of this graph is not necessary for proximity tracing nor for                           
analyzing the spread of SARS-CoV-2. Therefore, ​no party needs to learn the interaction                         
graph.  
 
Location traceability. ​To perform proximity tracing, location traces (e.g. GPS coordinates)                     
are not required. Therefore, no party in the system needs to have access to them or be                                 
able to easily trace individuals based on the BLE signals that the app broadcasts. 
 
At-risk individuals. ​At-risk individuals are people who have recently been in contact with                         
somebody who has tested positive for COVID-19. At-risk individuals need to know that                         
they have been exposed to the virus so that they can take appropriate measures. No                             
other party in the system needs to learn this information, other than when the notified                             
user contacts and identifies herself to the health authority. 
 
COVID-19 positive status. ​Only the user and the health authority need to know that the                             
user has tested positive for COVID-19. No other party in the system needs to learn this                               
information. In particular, app users do not need to know which of the individuals with                             
whom they have been in contact have tested positive. 
 
(Highly) Exposed locations. ​The system does not need to reveal any information about the                           
locations that COVID-19 positive individuals have visited or the number of positive cases                         
that have visited a specific location (e.g., to build a heat map of exposures). Proximity                             
tracing can be performed without any party learning this information.  
Privacy analysis of low-cost design 
Social graph. The low-cost design does not reveal any information to any entity. Any two                             
users involved in a contact may learn this contact’s existence from the system, but this                             
was already known to them. 
 
Interaction graph. ​The system does not reveal any information about the interaction                       
between two users to any entity. The ​EphIDs ​revealed by COVID-19 positive users do not                            
allow any inference about the people they have been in contact with to anyone except                             
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those contacts. The system thus prevents outside parties from learning the interaction                       
graph. 
 
Location traceability. ​In our low-cost design, the ​EphIDs of all users are unlinkable, and                           
only the smartphone that generated them knows the corresponding seeds ​SK ​
t ​. When the                         
phone’s owner is diagnosed with SARS-Cov-2 and gives permission, the phone publishes                       
to the backend the seed ​SK ​
t
corresponding to the first contagious day. After disclosing                           
this information, the phone will generate a new seed at random. Given the seed ​SK ​
t
of the                                 
first contagious day, the ​EphIDs of a COVID-19 positive user are linkable from the start of                               
the contagious window until the time of upload (at which point the phone picks a new                               
seed). 
 
As a result, tech-savvy users, eavesdroppers, and state-level adversaries can ​locally track                       
infected patients during the (past) window in which the identifiers broadcasted via                       
Bluetooth are linkable. To do so, the attacker uses strategically placed Bluetooth                       
receivers and recording devices to receive ​EphIDs ​. The app’s Bluetooth broadcasts of                       
non-diagnosed users and COVID-19 positive users outside the contagious window remain                     
unlinkable. 
 
At-risk individuals. ​The seeds revealed to the server by COVID-19 positive users ​are                         
independent of their contacts, i.e., the people they interacted with. They therefore do not                           
give any information about people at risk to any party other than the at-risk individuals                             
themselves. 
 
COVID-19 positive status. ​Any proximity tracing system that informs a user that she has                           
been in contact with a confirmed positive case inherently reveals a piece of information                           
to the person at risk: one of the people they interacted with has tested positive for                               
COVID-19. 
 
A curious or malicious adversary might attempt to exploit this and other information in                           
the system to identify the COVID-positive individuals with whom they have been in close                           
proximity.  
 
A curious user who only uses the standard interface of the app, cannot learn which of                               
their contacts has tested positive because the app in normal operation does not reveal                           
any information other than that the user was exposed at some point in the past. Such a                                 
curious user can only learn which of their contacts has tested positive if they learn this                               
fact on an out-of-band channel (e.g., the COVID-positive person informs them, they                       
observe the person going to the hospital, a common friend reveals the COVID-positve                         
status, etc.). 
 
A proactive tech-savvy adversary can abuse any proximity tracing system to identify                       
individuals who have reported a positive diagnosis to the system and that she has been in                               
close proximity with. This risk is a consequence of the basic proximity tracing                         
functionality. The attack can be executed regardless of implementation and proximity                     
tracing protocol (BLE or otherwise). It only relies on the single bit of information that any                               
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proximity tracing system must reveal — whether you have been exposed to a confirmed                           
COVID-19 positive case. 
 
To reveal an individual’s COVID-19 positive status, the adversary must (1) keep a detailed                           
log of who they saw and when, (2) register many accounts in the proximity tracing system,                               
and (3) use each account for proximity tracing during a short time window. When one of                               
these accounts is notified, the attacker can link the account identifier back to the                           
time-window in which the contact occurred to learn when she was in close proximity to an                               
individual who reported a positive diagnosis​. The attacker can correlate this information                       
with their detailed interaction log to narrow down who in their list of contacts is COVID-19                               
positive. In some cases, the adversary might even be able to single out an individual. This                               
attack ​is inherent to any proximity-based notification system, as the adversary only uses                         
the fact that they are notified together with additional information gathered by their                         
phone or through other means.  15
 
In decentralized proximity tracing systems, such as the three designs we propose in this                           
white-paper, tech-savvy adversaries can learn when they were in close proximity to a                         
COVID-19 positive individual without having to create multiple accounts. To determine                     
when they interacted with a COVID-19 positive individual, they ​proactively modify the app                       
to store detailed logs of which ​EphID they received and when, and cross reference this                               16
list with the ​EphIDs reported by COVID-19 positive cases downloaded from the backend                         
server. They then correlate exposure times with their log of who they saw to reveal which                               
individuals they have been in contact with reported a positive diagnosis. 
 
The low-cost design allows an adversary to ​link ​the EphIDs reported by COVID-19 positive                           
cases, i.e. to learn which Bluetooth identifiers belong to the same device​. ​COVID-19                         
positive individuals upload a single seed ​SK ​
t
that enables others to reconstruct, and thus                           
link, a person’s ​EphIDs for the entire contagious period. Due to the linkability of                           
reported ​EphIDs ​, an attacker can ​combine observations at different times to identify                       
who reported a positive diagnosis to the system​. ​For example, the attacker might learn                           
that the infected person she saw at 10:11AM is ​the same as the one she saw at 14:14PM.                                   
While she may have encountered many different people at each time, the intersection                         
might be much smaller. This further increases the likelihood that the attacker can                         
successfully single out a COVID-19 positive individual.  
 
Tech-savvy users can also conduct a retroactive attack in which they attempt                       
reidentification based on linkage and stored data, without the need to collect additional                         
information in advance. The retroactive attacker only uses information stored by the app                         
and auxiliary knowledge about the whereabouts of individuals during the contagious                     
period. The data stored in the app provides coarse timing information when a specific                           
15 For further details on this attack see “Privacy and Security Risk Evaluation of Digital Proximity 
Tracing Systems”, The DP-3T Project, 
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Secu
rity%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf 
16 We note that in some schemes such modifications would preclude the App from accessing                             
measurement data entirely when using the Google and Apple API. 
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EphID ​has been observed, e.g., per day in the low-cost design. A tech-savvy adversary                          
could leverage this information to single out a COVID-19 positive individual based on                         
matching observed ​EphIDs ​to background knowledge of whom the adversary was with                      
during this time window. A combination of multiple time windows might be enough to                           
uniquely identify to whom the reported ​EphIDs belong. However, since smartphones                     
broadcast the daily set of ​EphIDs in random order, the attacker cannot use the                           
published seeds ​SK ​
t
to narrow down this coarse time-window. This decreases the                       
likelihood that she will be able to successfully identify the COVID-19 positive individual in                           
her contact list.  
 
To ​re-identify an individual who has reported a positive diagnosis for COVID-19 to the                           
system, an adversary needs to be able to ​associate an identity to the auxiliary                           
information they have collected. For instance, a tech-savvy adversary who collects a                       
detailed log of who they saw when needs to associate identities to each log entry. Without                               
knowing the identities, the adversary cannot learn who tested positive. We can divide                         
individuals the adversary interacts with into three groups depending on whether she will                         
be able to reveal their identities or not: 
 
● Close individuals​: Family, friends, or colleagues with whom the adversary spends                     
long periods of time. If these people received a positive diagnosis, they ​will inform                           
the adversary personally about their diagnosis ​if they have spent time together. It                         
is common practice that the authorities ask COVID-19 patients to notify any                       
contact person at risk they remember. 
 
● Routine-sharing individuals​: People who share an activity with the adversary, such                     
as riding a bus every day, supermarket tellers, etc. COVID-19 positive individuals in                         
this group will likely not remember having been in contact with them and                         
therefore will not (and cannot) notify the adversary. 
 
● Anonymous individuals: People that the adversary sees sporadically and whose                   
identities are unknown to the adversary. 
 
As close individuals will reveal themselves, there is no extra information that an                         
adversary can gain about the COVID-19 positive status of this group by exploiting the app.                             
Anonymous COVID-19 positive users cannot be easily identified. Their privacy is only at                         
risk if the adversary deploys additional (costly) means to associate identities with                       
collected background knowledge. For instance, the adversary could attempt to combine                     
data from surveillance cameras with facial recognition techniques to learn who is whom.                         
The main group that is thus at risk through identification attacks is routine-sharing                         
individuals. 
 
We stress that in any case, having been close to an COVID-19 positive person is not proof                                 
of causality regarding transmission of the virus. Moreover, it is worth noting that                         
reidentifying individuals and inferring their health status as a private entity without their                         
permission would likely violate data protection law and, potentially, computer misuse                     
law, which would further increase the cost and risk of undertaking this attack. 
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The pattern associated with the upload of identifiers to the server would reveal the                           
COVID-19 positive status of users to network eavesdroppers (ISP or curious WiFi provider)                         
and tech-savvy adversaries. If these adversaries can bind the observed IP address to a                           
more stable identifier such as an ISP subscription number, then they can de-anonymize                         
the confirmed positive cases. This can be mitigated by using dummy uploads. These                         
dummy uploads provide plausible deniability to actual users’ uploads, i.e., given an                       
upload an observer cannot distinguish if it corresponds to an actual positive or a dummy.                             
To avoid revealing which uploads were dummies to an adversary that polls the backend                           
to learn if the list of ephemeral identifiers was updated, the backend should batch                           
updates and only publish them in designated download slots.  17
 
The backend server learns the IP address of COVID-19 positive users when they upload (a                             
representation of) their ​EphIDs ​. If this adversary can bind the observed IP address to a                             
more stable identifier, they can de-anonymize the confirmed positive patients. ​To reduce                       
the risk, we recommend that the backend not log IPs. 
 
Mitigations​. In the current setting, retroactive attackers can link beacons received at                       
different, coarse times to aid in identifying COVID-19 positive users. The amount of                         
information available to such an attacker can be reduced by running the proximity tracing                           
protocol either inside a privileged OS-level module or inside a local trusted execution                         18
environment (TEE). These approaches isolate the proximity tracing protocol and the data                       
they collect from users and malicious apps. The protocols running in the isolated                         
environment would only output for each matching beacon: the corresponding exposure                     
measurement (e.g., the attenuation) and a coarse time. The app then computes the                         
exposure score (see ​Section 4​). As a result, retroactive attackers can only learn the                           
number of beacons of infected patients received each day but can no longer link beacons                             
by the same COVID-19 positive patient. 
 
By itself, this approach does not protect against tech-savvy users that proactively modify                         
their device to collect beacons and then compute matching COVID-19 positive beacons                       
using the public list of COVID-19 positive ​EphIDs ​. However, when using TEEs to isolate the                             
proximity protocol, the system can be extended to hide this public list from tech-savvy                           
users, ensuring that they ​cannot ​recognize COVID-19 positive beacons. To protect against                       
tech-savvy users when using TEEs, the backend encrypts the list of seeds so that this list                               
can only be decrypted ​inside the TEE. Each TEE downloads and decrypts the list of                             
infected ​EphIDs and finds the matching beacons by cross referencing the list of infected                           
EphIDs with the collected beacons. The TEE then returns to the app, for each day, a                               
vector of the exposure measurements that enable the app to determine the user’s                         
exposure. As long as the TEE remains secure, tech-savvy users do not learn the ​EphIDs of                               
COVID-19 positive patients.  
 
Modern phones are equipped with TEEs that are used to harden smartphone kernels                         
against attacks and to store cryptographic seeds. TEEs require buy-in from mobile                       
17 Details on the generation of dummy traffic will be provided in future documentation. 
18 This is the approach taken by the Google/Apple API. 
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platform providers (Apple, Google) and, for Android, the device manufacturers (Samsung,                     
Huawei, etc.). The TEEs are well protected and difficult to attack even for tech-savvy users.                             
While it is not impossible to leak this information, it is unlikely. We think such a mitigation                                 
is worthwhile in a later version of the proximity tracing system to further increase privacy                             
guarantees. Other mitigation techniques could include the use of Private Information                     
Retrieval and Private Set Intersection techniques, although current implementations may                   
bring severe performance penalties.  
 
Such technical measures as well as non-technical measures (e.g., banning modified                     
applications from the market) could be introduced in case that the identification of                         
COVID-19 positive individuals would become a threat to the system operation and to the                           
users. The introduction of such measures depends on the overall risk assessment.  
 
Finally, we note that if a small, cautious or misinformed portion of the population is                             
concerned with these attacks and decides not to participate, this will not greatly impair                           
the effectiveness of the deployment. As long as a large fraction of the population runs the                               
app, the number of at-risk identifications will be large enough to significantly reduce the                           
rate of transmission. 
 
(Highly) Exposed locations. A powerful tech-savvy adversary operating its own BLE                     
equipment from a single location can collect ​EphIDs within 20-100m range, depending                       
on the phone output power and environment. When combining this list with the ​EphID ​s                           
that can be computed from the ​SKs downloaded to the phone, an adversary could learn                             
whether any COVID-19 positive user has visited the location in a small radius of 50m.                             
Furthermore, the adversary could reveal how many distinct diagnosed persons have                     
visited the location in the past. 
Privacy analysis of unlinkable design 
The unlinkable design provides overall better privacy properties at the cost of increased                         
bandwidth. The two designs provide the same level of protection for the social and                           
interaction graph. We address the remaining differences point by point. 
 
Location traceability. ​In the unlinkable design, the ​EphIDs remain unlinkable for all                       
users against a local attacker. This unlinkability also holds for COVID-19 positive patients                         
so long as the server is honest. However, if the server is malicious, then it can infer which                                   
ephemeral identifiers belong to a COVID-19 positive user through timing information or                       
other metadata created when ephemeral identifiers are uploaded to the server. The use                         
of anonymous communications could mitigate this threat. 
 
At-risk individuals. ​As in the low-cost design, the seeds revealed to the server by users                             
who have received a positive diagnosis ​are independent of their contacts. Hence, they do                           
not give any information about people at risk. 
 
The rest of the analysis is the same as for the low-cost design. 
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COVID-19 positive status. ​The unlinkable design reduces the linkability of the ​EphIDs                       
reported by a COVID-19 positive user. Compared to the low-cost design, this reduces the                           
likelihood that a proactive or retroactive tech-savvy adversary can identify which of their                         
contacts has reported a positive diagnosis through linkage attacks. The adversary can no                         
longer combine observations at multiple points of time to single out a COVID-19 positive                           
individual.  
 
Retroactive attackers can extract little information from the records stored on the phone.                         
For each beacon, the phone only stores the hashed string, a coarse receive time (e.g., the                               
day on which the beacon was received) and the exposure measurement. Retroactive                       
attackers cannot recover a more detailed receive time, and thus only learn the total count                             
of COVID-19 positive beacons for each day. 
 
However, a proactive tech-savvy adversary can still modify their application to learn when                         
she has been in close proximity to a confirmed positive case. As described in our detailed                               
privacy risk evaluation, this attack can be executed in any proximity tracing system by                           19
using multiple accounts. It cannot be avoided.  
 
The unlinkable design enables COVID-19 positive individuals to redact periods of time that                         
they consider sensitive and for which they prefer not to disclose their contacts. This can                             
alleviate concerns in a close-knit or small community in which users may be concerned                           
that community members learn of their positive diagnosis through the app, instead of                         
being informed in person. 
 
(Highly) Exposed locations. As in any practical BLE-based PT system, an adversary could                         
identify locations that have been visited by COVID-positive users in the past. However, as                           
EphIDs cannot be linked to a single device, it is more difficult for the adversary to learn                                 
how many distinct cases visited the location. 
Privacy analysis of hybrid design 
The hybrid design provides privacy properties similar to the low-cost and the unlinkable                         
design. There are two major differences between the hybrid and the low-cost design. 
 
1) The hybrid design controls the linkability of the ephemeral identifiers reported by                       
COVID-19 positive users and restricts linkability to short to medium-length time                     
windows. 
 
2) The hybrid design allows users who report a positive diagnosis to redact                       
identifiers for specific time windows before sharing them with other devices. 
 
19 See “Privacy and Security Risk Evaluation of Digital Proximity Tracing Systems”, The DP-3T                           
Project, 
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Secu
rity%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf 
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These two differences affect the privacy properties of the hybrid design in the following                           
ways: 
 
COVID-19 positive status. ​Proactive and retroactive linkage attacks by tech-savvy                   
adversaries aim to reveal the COVID-19 positive status of individuals they have been in                           
close proximity with. To learn this information, the adversary needs to extract from the                           
system ​at which times ​they have been in contact with a COVID-19 positive user. They can                               
then correlate this information to auxiliary knowledge about who they saw when to                         
identify individuals who reported a positive diagnosis. If the adversary can link ephemeral                         
identifiers, i.e., associate multiple of the EphIDs reported by COVID-19 positive users to                         
the same individual, the adversary can combine observations from different time frames                       
to single out individuals. The hybrid design restricts the linkability of reported EphIDs to a                             
time window ​w ​. This reduces the likelihood that the adversary can successfully narrow                         
down the group of contacts who might have tested positive.  
 
In comparison to the unlinkable design, the medium-term linkability of EphIDs implies the                         
hybrid design provides slightly less protection against proactive and retroactive                   
identification attacks. We note though, that as in all decentralized designs discussed in                         
this white paper, the proactive tech-savvy user must modify their application to record                         
receive times. 
 
The hybrid design allows COVID-19 positive users to decide not to share their broadcast                           
identifiers for certain time windows. This further reduces the likelihood of successful                       
identification attacks as the adversary cannot use auxiliary information for the redacted                       
time frames to reveal the identity of diagnosed users. 
 
Retroactive attackers can extract some information from the records stored on the phone.                         
For each beacon, the phone stores the ​EphID ​, a time and the exposure measurement.                           
Because ​EphIDs from the same COVID-19 positive patient are linkable during a time                         
window, the retroactive attacker can estimate contact duration with a single COVID-19                       
positive patient for each time window.  20
 
(Highly) Exposed locations. ​An adversary is less likely to be able to learn the number of                               
positive cases who visited a specific location because of the restricted linkability of                         
ephemeral identifiers. The adversary can link EphIDs for the duration of a time window                           
but cannot link identifiers of the same individual across multiple time windows.  
5.3 Security 
Security concerns 
Fake exposure events. A fake exposure event could make a person believe that they are at                               
risk, even though they have never been exposed to a diagnosed user. Attackers could try                             
20 This retroactive attack does not work when using the Google/Apple API as it does not expose                                 
received EphID to any application or user. 
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to generate fake exposure events to trigger false alerts, e.g. by relaying or broadcasting                           
EphIDs at large scale. This would violate the authenticity requirement of the system. 
 
Suppressing at-risk contacts: There is a risk that either a COVID-19 positive user or the                             
backend server could prevent other individuals from learning they are at risk, e.g., by                           
modifying the app’s local storage. This violates the integrity of the system and would lead                             
to an increased health risk for at-risk individuals who rely on the system for alerts. 
 
Prevent contact discovery: ​A malicious actor could disrupt the system, e.g. by jamming                         
Bluetooth signals, and prevent contact discovery.  
Security analysis of low-cost design 
Fake exposure events. ​In all practical proximity tracing systems based on                     
Bluetooth-based exposure measurements, an adversary with a powerful antenna can                   
trigger false alerts of an exposure to a COVID-19 positive person that do not reflect                             
real-world proximity to a positive-case person.  
 
To cause false alarms, a malicious adversary simply places her proximity tracing device in                           
a crowded area and hooks up a powerful transmitter to ​artificially increase the range of                             
her Bluetooth contacts. As a result, other devices located beyond 2 meters can interact                           
with the attacker’s device and will perceive the attacker’s device as “near-by”. To                         
complete the attack, the attacker must ensure that these interactions between her device                         
and other devices are flagged as exposure events. To do so, the attacker either: 
 
1. Herself tests positive and brings her device to the hospital when she gets tested                           
(requiring the adversary to be infected). 
 
2. Bribes a diagnosed person to bring the attacker’s device to the hospital instead of                           
their own (or simply obtains the upload authorization code from them). 
 
3. Hijacks/bribes ​the health authority that authorises COVID-19 positive individuals                 
to trigger proximity tracing. 
 
4. Compromises the backend server that sends information or directly notifies users                     
of the system.  
 
In the low-cost design, an attacker can record an individual’s ephemeral identifier and                         
broadcast it to victims at a different location and/or time, as long as it is ​relayed on the                                   
same day​. If that individual later receives a positive diagnosis, the victims will incorrectly                           
believe they have been exposed. 
 
In the low-cost design, the seeds of COVID-19 positive users shared for exposure                         
calculation are bound to the day on which they were valid. This prevents relay attacks in                               
which the adversary attempts to relay an individual’s ephemeral identifiers with a delay                         
of more than 24 hours. 
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An attacker could be motivated to claim another user’s ​EphID as their own and report                             
that it should be included in the exposure risk calculation. The low-cost design addresses                           
this risk by requiring users to upload the seeds ​SK ​
t
from which their ​EphIDs ​are derived.                              
As these ​EphIDs are derived from the seed using a cryptographic hash function and a                             
pseudo-random function, it is computationally infeasible for an attack to learn another                       
user's seed from observing their broadcasts.  
 
Suppressing at-risk contacts. ​Hiding at-risk contacts is possible in any proximity tracing                       
system. Infected users can choose to not participate at all; to temporarily not broadcast                           
Bluetooth identifiers, or not to upload their data once diagnosed.  
 
Prevent contact discovery. ​Any proximity tracing system based on Bluetooth low energy is                         
susceptible to jamming attacks by active adversaries. Such jamming attacks will cause the                         
normal recording of ​EphIDs to stop working, hence preventing contact discovery. This is                         
an inherent problem of this approach. 
Security analysis of unlinkable design 
The unlinkable design has the same security properties as the low-cost design with                         
respect to ​suppressing at-risk contacts​ and ​preventing contact discovery​. 
 
Fake exposure events. ​As in all practical proximity tracing systems based on BLE                         
handshakes between personal smartphones, ​a powerful adversary can cause false alarms                     
through BLE range extension attacks.  21
 
In the unlinkable design, ephemeral identifiers are cryptographically linked to the ​epoch                       
in which they are broadcast. To create fake exposure events, the attacker must therefore                           
receive and rebroadcast ​EphID ​s ​within the same epoch. ​Such an ​“online” relay attack is                           
unavoidable in proximity tracing systems based on passive Bluetooth advertisements. 
 
As in the low-cost design, the ​EphID ​generation protocol of the unlinkable design                        
prevents an attacker from claiming another user’s ​EphID ​as their own. To do so, an                            
attacker would have to be able to infer a user’s seed seedt from their broadcast identifier                               
which is computationally infeasible. 
Security analysis of hybrid design 
The hybrid design has the same security properties as the low-cost design with respect to                             
the risks of suppressing at-risk contact and preventing contact discovery. 
 
21 For further details on this general attack see “Privacy and Security Risk Evaluation of Digital 
Proximity Tracing Systems”, The DP-3T Project, 
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Secu
rity%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf 
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Fake exposure events. ​As in all practical proximity tracing systems based on BLE                         
handshakes between personal smartphones, a powerful adversary can cause false alarms                     
through BLE range extension attacks. 
 
In the hybrid design, EphIDs are linked to the valid time window of the seed they were                                 
derived from. To create fake exposure events, the adversary must therefore receive and                         
broadcast EphIDs within the same time window. This prevents relay attacks in which the                           
adversary attempts to relay an individual’s ephemeral identifiers with a delay of more                         
than the length of a time window. 
 
As in the low-cost design, the ​EphID ​generation protocol of the hybrid design prevents                          
an attacker from claiming another user’s ​EphID ​as their own. To do so, an attacker would                              
have to be able to infer a user’s seed value ​seed ​
w ​from their broadcast identifier which is                                
computationally infeasible. 
6. Protection from short-term and remote eavesdropping at the                 
physical layer  
In this section, we introduce an enhancement to the decentralised proximity tracing                       
solutions proposed in this document. It would also apply to similar initiatives such as                           
PACT and TCN,  and the ​joint​ Apple and Google Exposure Notification protocol.   22 23
 
A shortcoming in most decentralized ​proximity tracing systems based on the exchange                       
of BT advertisements between devices is that a malicious party who is willing to modify                             
their app or deploy their own software is able to record a proximity event ​despite only                               
being in contact for a short amount of time or at a long distance​. This violates the                                 
requirement that the system provide ​precise ​data, i.e. only report exposure events that                         
represent actual physical proximity. 
 
In particular, an attacker could attempt to gather a significant number of ​EphIDs by                           
deploying specialist equipment, either in high-traffic locations or in a vehicle that can                         
cover a wide area (“wardriving”). The attacker can also deploy high gain, directional                         
antennas to cover wide areas, further increasing the range and selectivity of the attack.                           
The attacker can later see which of the recorded ​EphIDs correspond to users who                           
reported a positive diagnosis and use additional metadata such as location, timing, video                         
surveillance, etc. to infer their identities.  
 
We note that for these enhancements to be efficient, changes in low-level smartphone                         
components (e.g., Bluetooth chips) are likely necessary. We expect that without these                       
changes, these enhancements will have a non-negligible impact on battery life. 
22For PACT, see Justin Chan et al. (2020) ​PACT: Privacy Sensitive Protocols and Mechanisms for                             
Mobile Contact Tracing​, retrieved from: ​https://covidsafe.cs.washington.edu/​on 20 May 2020. For                   
TCN, see TCN Coalition (2020) ​TCN Protocol​, retrieved from ​https://github.com/TCNCoalition/TCN                   
on 20 May 2020. 
23See ​https://www.apple.com/covid19/contacttracing/ 
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EphID​ spreading with secret sharing  
To address these problems, we introduce an enhancement to our system: ​EphID                       
Spreading With Secret Sharing​. 
 
In a nutshell, this enhancement spreads each ephemeral identifier ​EphID across                     
low-power beacons using a ​k-out-of-n secret sharing scheme​. Instead of transmitting each                       
EphID ​within a single beacon, we encode it into n shares, such that each receiver needs                              
to receive at least k shares to reconstruct the ​EphID. ​There are a number of secret                              
sharing techniques that could be used for this purpose. We are currently running                         
experiments to determine which is the most robust scheme for the scenarios in which                           
these systems are to be deployed. 
 
  
Figure SW: ​EphID​ ​spreading with secret sharing.  
 
In our earlier designs, each device divides time into epochs and picks a random ​EphID ​
i
                             
for each epoch ​i ​. The ​EphID is transmitted several times during the epoch and each                             
broadcast contains the whole ​EphID ​. The broadcast frequency depends on manufacturer-                     
and implementation-specific details. 
 
With this enhancement, each broadcast contains shares of the ​EphID ​. If ​EphID is to be                             
retransmitted within an epoch, new shares are generated. In the simplest case, however,                         
the number n of shares can be set to equal the number of broadcasts that the device                                 
makes within an epoch. We stress that this enhancement, even with the spread of the                             
EphIDs ​, should not have a significant impact on battery life. It requires no additional                           
transmission or reception over the basic designs, and the additional computation is                       
minimal.  
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Tuning the trade-off between privacy and utility 
Tuning privacy parameters. ​Setting the value k requires careful consideration. A system                       
must receive enough beacons during the contact interval (as determined by                     
epidemiologists) to receive k shares and register a contact. A smaller k thus increases the                             
robustness of the system in normal operation. However, the larger the value of k, the                             
longer an adversary is forced to shadow a victim in order to collect a sufficient number of                                 
beacons to reconstruct the ​EphID. ​Hence, the proposed number k of shares is a                          
trade-off between privacy and the ability to record short contacts.  
 
Eavesdropping from a distance. ​Spreading ​EphID ​across beacons not only protects                     
against eavesdropping by adversaries who are only briefly collocated with their victim,                       
but it also makes eavesdropping from a distance much harder. The requirement to                         
successfully receive multiple broadcasts increases the asymmetry between a legitimate                   
receiver in proximity and a malicious eavesdropper at a distance. An eavesdropper who is                           
placed further away will typically experience a worse channel to the transmitter and a                           
higher packet loss.  
 
If we assume an attacker without access to specialised equipment and with reasonable                         
assumptions on the broadcast transmission power, frequency, and probability of                   
successful reception, we can select k, n such that a close by, legitimate user within 5                               
meters would have a very high probability of successfully receiving an ​EphID within a                           
reasonable contact time threshold of five minutes (>99.9%), but an attacker attempting to                         
eavesdrop from 16 meters away would have a small probability of success (<1%). An                           
attacker using specialised hardware would be able to improve their odds either by                         
increasing their probability of successful reception or by cryptographic analysis of the                       
malformed broadcasts.  
 
To achieve the appropriate balance between the desired range of reception of ​EphIDs                         
(epidemiologically relevant) and the resilience to eavesdropping, we need to select the                       
right combination of transmission power, transmission frequency, and required number k                     
of reconstruction shares. We expect these parameters to be configurable and determined                       
by further experiments, functional requirements, and risk assessment. The use of                     
ultra-low or low power beacons will likely best protect the privacy of the users and                             
facilitate proximity detection.  
 
Our scheme can be integrated within a ranging technique or used in addition to existing                             
(e.g., RSSI-based) ranging. In the latter case, ranging would use a different epoch                         
identifier that is different but linked to the ​EphID ​that the device is broadcasting. If                            
supported by BLE chipsets, this scheme could be further enhanced by in addition                         
distributing the shares across three BLE advertisement channels.    
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7. Comparison with centralized approaches 
We classify two key functionalities in proximity tracing systems that are decentralized in                         
our schemes: 
 
● Ephemeral identifier generation: Ephemeral identifiers broadcast via Bluetooth are                 
generated on the phone. 
 
● Exposure estimation: The estimation of the exposure is computed locally on the                       
phone. 
 
We now compare the security and privacy properties of the decentralized approaches                       
presented above with schemes in which both operations are centralized, and with                       
schemes in which seeds are generated on phones but COVID-exposure estimation is                       
centralized.  
7.1 Centralized identifier generation and exposure estimation 
In approaches in which both identifier generation and COVID-exposure estimation are                     
centralized, such as ROBERT, PEPP-PT-NTK, and OpenTrace/BlueTrace/TraceTogether,             24 25 26
a central server estimates a user’s likelihood of COVID-exposure, instead of the user’s                         
smartphone in decentralized designs. Depending on the system, the server notifies the                       
at-risk users (PEPP-PT-NTK, OpenTrace) or users query the server about their status                       
(ROBERT). 
 
In all these systems, the central server holds a long-term pseudo-identifier for every user                           
and uses it to derive ephemeral pseudo-identities (​EphIDs ​) that are pushed to the                         
smartphones.  
 
The smartphones broadcast the ​EphIDs received from the central server and record the                         
EphID ​s transmitted by near-by smartphones. Smartphones ​locally store all observed                   
EphIDs ​ together with their corresponding proximity and duration. See Figure ZZ.  
 
In case of a positive diagnosis, users can give permission for their smartphone to send                             
the recorded list of observations to the server to enable proximity tracing. 
 
24 Inria PRIVATICS and Fraunhofer AISEC (19 April 2020) ​ROBERT: ROBust and privacy presERving                           
proximity Tracing​. Retrieved from ​https://github.com/ROBERT-proximity-tracing/​ on 19 May 2020.  
25 PEPP-PT (20 April 2020) ​Data Protection and Information Security Architecture: Illustrated on 
German Implementation​. Retrieved from ​https://github.com/pepp-pt/​ on 19 May 2020. 
26 Jason Bay, Joel Kek, Alvin Tan, Chai Sheng Hau, Lai Yongquan, Janice Tan, Tang Anh Quy (9 April                                     
2020) ​BlueTrace: A privacy-preserving protocol for community-driven contact tracing across                   
borders​. Retrieved from ​https://bluetrace.io/​ on 19 May 2020. 
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Figure ZZ: Processing and storing of observed ​EphIDs​. 
Central proximity tracing 
PEPP-PT-NTK and OpenTrace 
The PEPP-PT-NTK and OpenTrace backends execute the proximity tracing process after a                       
diagnosed user has uploaded their list of observations [(​EphID ​, epoch, duration)] for the                         
contagious window. The backend recovers the long-term pseudo-identifiers of the at-risk                     
users from the reported observed ​EphIDs and triggers a process to notify them if their                             
exposure is high enough. See Figure ZY. 
 
 
Figure ZY: Proximity tracing for centralized PEPP-PT-NTK and OpenTrace designs.​ In 
ROBERT, the users instead query the backend. 
ROBERT 
In the ROBERT system, the backend tracks the exposure of each user of the system. As in                                 
PEPP-PT-NTK and OpenTrace, COVID-19 diagnosed patients upload their observed EphIDs                   
to the backend server. The backend server associates these observed EphIDs to long-term                         
pseudo-identifiers of at-risk users. The backend uses the associated data to update the                         
exposure for each of the at-risk users.  
 
42 
DP-3T Project 
 
Unlike PEPP-PT-NTK and OpenTrace, the backend does not notify patients. Instead,                     
smartphones of ROBERT users regularly query the backend to request their exposure                       
status. The backend answers whether the exposure passed the threshold or not. 
7.2 Local identifier generation and centralized exposure estimation 
Other approaches, such as DESIRE instead generate identifiers on the phone, while still                         27
estimating COVID-exposure centrally. Instead of broadcasting self-contained, ephemeral               
identifiers, smartphones in DESIRE broadcast ephemeral public keys that, when combined                     
with others’ public keys, yield ephemeral identifiers ​EphIDs ​.  
 
In case of a positive diagnosis, users can give permission for their smartphone to send a                               
version of the observed ​EphIDs ​ to the backend to enable proximity tracing. 
Central proximity tracing 
Smartphones regularly query the backend to request their current exposure status. To                       
enable the backend to compute this status, phones upload a version of the ​EphIDs                           
computed from all the encounters they had in the relevant period. The server takes all                             
observations reported of these encounters [(​EphID ​, epoch, duration)] and estimates                   
exposure. If the exposure is long enough, the user receives a positive exposure response.                           
Otherwise, the user receives a negative. 
7.3 Privacy comparison 
Social graph. ​In a system in which both identifiers and COVID-exposure are computed                         
centrally, the backend server can always associate ephemeral broadcast identifiers with                     
permanent pseudo-identifiers for individual devices. If ​EphIDs are associated with a                     
long-term identifier (e.g., in PEPP-PT-NTK), the backend server can reconstruct the social                       
graph of users from the information shared by COVID-19 positive users. The server can                           
join subgraphs from different positive cases to gain a comprehensive picture of the true                           
underlying social graph. Given other partial social graphs with identities, the server can                         
match its graph to the other graphs and reidentify nodes. 
  
ROBERT and DESIRE propose to prevent the leakage of the social graph by using an                             
anonymous communication network to upload observed identifiers in an unlinkable                   
manner. In this way, the backend cannot associate uploads to a user nor determine which                             
identifiers were observed by the same COVID-19 positive user. As a result, the backend                           
cannot reconstruct an infected user’s contacts.  
27 Castellucia et al. (9 May 2020) DESIRE: A third way for a European Exposure Notification System                                 
https://github.com/3rd-ways-for-EU-exposure-notification/project-DESIRE/blob/master/DESIRE-s
pecification-EN-v1_0.pdf​ on 19 May 2020.  
43 
DP-3T Project 
 
In separate documents, we show that (1) these mechanisms when applied to ROBERT are                           
ineffective and still allow reconstruction of the social graph; and (2) are difficult to                           28
realise in practice for DESIRE.  29
 
Interaction graph. ​In a system in which both identifiers and COVID-exposure are                       
computed centrally and uploaded observed identifiers are linked, the backend server can                       
always associate uploaded ephemeral broadcast identifiers to permanent               
pseudo-identifiers for individual devices. In PEPP-PT-NTK, OpenTrace, and ROBERT,                 
observed identifiers are timestamped. Thus the backend server can not only reconstruct a                         
social graph, but it can reconstruct an interaction graph.  
 
The subset of the full interaction graph learned by a server grows quickly as every newly                               
confirmed positive user uploads their entire contact history, which can be linked to                         
existing nodes in the graph. Even though the nodes in the graph are pseudonymous, this                             
is a serious privacy concern because graph data is easy to reidentify.​28 
 
If deployed (including anonymous communication, ensuring enough mixing with uploads                   
of other COVID-positive patients, and anonymous authentication), the mechanisms in                   
DESIRE to protect the social graph preclude the DESIRE backend from learning the                         
interaction graph. 
 
Location traceability. ​The decentralized design limits the potential for location tracking to                       
users who have received a positive diagnosis and for the course of the contagious period.                             
In centralised systems in which keys are generated on the server, access to server-side                           
keys (e.g., the backend itself or law enforcement) enables linking ephemeral ​EphIDs to                         
the corresponding permanent app identifier. This enables tracing/identifying people                 
based on ​EphIDs ​ observed in the past, as well as tracing peoples’ future movements.  
 
When keys are generated on the phone and not used directly as ​EphIDs ​, as in DESIRE,                               
location traceability is equivalent to the ​decentralised unlinkable design​. 
 
At-risk individuals. ​In centralised systems in which the server controls key generation and                         
notifies the user (PEPP-PT-NTK, OpenTrace), by design, the backend recovers the identity                       
of an at-risk individual to notify these individuals. 
 
In other centralised designs (ROBERT, DESIRE), users query the server to learn their                         
exposure status. The identity of at-risk users is only protected when servers cannot                         
deanonymize users through their permanent app identifiers and network identifiers. 
 
As in decentralized designs, network eavesdroppers do not learn at-risk status. 
28 See, “Security and privacy analysis of the document ‘ROBERT: ROBust and privacy-presERving                         
proximity Tracing’”, The DP-3T Project, version 22 April 2020,                 
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/ROBERT%20-%20Securit
y%20and%20privacy%20analysis.pdf  
29 See, “DESIRE: A Practical Assessment”, The DP3T Consortium, version 13 May 2020,                         
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/DESIRE%20-%20A%20Pr
actical%20Assessment.pdf  
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COVID-19 positive status. The centralised and decentralised proximity tracing systems                   
share the inherent privacy limitation that they can be exploited by a tech-savvy user to                             
reveal which individuals in their contact list might be infected. However, the centralised                         
designs hide when and how often the user was in contact with a COVID-positive patient.                             
As a result, tech-savvy attackers cannot benefit from linking between ​EphIDs and timing                         
information to amplify their attack. Instead, they need to rely on multiple accounts. 
 
Depending on whether the centralized designs deploy dummy traffic correctly, network                     
eavesdroppers might still learn the COVID-19 status of users of the system. 
7.4 Security comparison 
Fake exposure events. ​Triggering false alerts is easy in all centralised designs except                         
DESIRE and can be done retroactively by any tech-savvy COVID-19 positive user. It does                           
not require broadcasting. It suffices to add the target’s ​EphIDs to the list of observed                             
events prior to uploading them to the backend. 
 
DESIRE requires an active exchange between users to trigger a fake exposure event, and                           
therefore requires broadcasting.  30
 
Suppressing at-risk contacts. ​Hiding at-risk contacts is possible in any proximity tracing                       
system.  
 
Prevent contact discovery. ​Any proximity tracing system based on Bluetooth BLE is                       
susceptible to jamming attacks by active adversaries.  
   
30 For further details on this general attack see “Privacy and Security Risk Evaluation of Digital                               
Proximity Tracing Systems”, The DP-3T Project,           
https://github.com/DP-3T/documents/blob/master/Security%20analysis/Privacy%20and%20Secu
rity%20Attacks%20on%20Digital%20Proximity%20Tracing%20Systems.pdf 
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8. Conclusion  
In this whitepaper, we designed a privacy-preserving proximity tracing system and                     
analyzed three different protocols. All three protocols minimize exposure of private data,                       
limiting the risk of a privacy leakage.  
 
Our design relies on smartphones to ​locally ​compute the exposure of an individual user                           
to the SARS-CoV-2 virus through proximity over a prolonged period of time to COVID-19                           
positive people. Data about specific exposure events, i.e., interactions of people, always                       
remains on a user’s phone. 
 
The three implementations offer different trade-offs between bandwidth and privacy                   
protection. One design results in an extremely lightweight system. The others offer extra                         
privacy properties at the cost of a small increase in download data size. The three                             
alternatives scale to a large number of users with minimal local computation and minimal                           
centralization. 
 
We also provided evaluation criteria to assess the level of privacy provided by any                           
proximity tracing solution. We thoroughly evaluated our protocols with respect to                     
performance, security, and privacy. Compared to central designs in which the backend                       
computes risks and informs users, our design protects interaction graphs from the                       
backend. Only a determined, tech-savvy adversary can learn any extra information                     
besides that made visible by the app. The centralized system, in comparison, leaks to the                             
backend unnecessary information about contacts and requires a large amount of trust in                         
a central entity. 
 
Our three implementations show that there are a wide range of alternatives to be                           
explored among the trade-off between resistance to different active and passive attacks,                       
battery consumption, and bandwidth overhead. We encourage researchers and                 
technology companies working on proximity tracing to continue searching for the best                       
realistic operation point.  
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